Hermetic Wiper – Targeted destructive malware  

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Hermetic Wiper – Targeted destructive malware  

Summary 

On February 24, 2022, we saw one of the largest targeted attacks in history that focused solely on the destruction of critical information and resources. This attack employed the use of a new type of destructive malware that began executing against Ukrainian targets shortly before Russia’s physical military invasion of the country.  

The malware used in this attack has been coined HermeticWiper, as the binaries are signed using a certificate by Hermetica Digital Ltd. This malware leverages legitimate EaseUS Partition Master drivers to access the disk of the victim’s computer, which in turn targets the Master Boot Record (MBR) of the disk. The MBR holds critical partition data necessary for computer systems to boot into an operating system. By targeting the MBR, the malware can carry out its intended goal of causing the data on disk to be destroyed, which would then be difficult and time-consuming to recover. VMware Carbon Black’s Global Incident Response Threat Report highlighted the steep 51% increase in the use of destructive malware in targeted attacks.  

Initial evidence suggests that these attacks are highly targeted and have been in development for some time as the original executables were compiled on December 28, 2021. Newer samples from February 23, 2022, have recently emerged which highlights this adversary’s ability to adapt and evolve quickly to execute their goal.   

During execution, the attacker first targets privilege escalation before targeting the Domain Controller. Once access to the Domain Controller is achieved, the attacker will utilize Active Directory to move laterally to deploy and execute the malware on additional systems. The Domain Controller itself is left intact to allow for widespread malware distribution within the victim network.  

There have been reported instances of ransomware being deployed concurrently with the wiper, dropping a ransom note on the system. The ransomware is then utilized to drop and execute the wiper in the environment. 

Technical Analysis 

Upon execution, the HermeticWiper binary drops a driver file in the folder C:\windows\system32\drivers\*.sys. This file is an EaseUS Partition Master driver which is leveraged to access disk partitions for destructive purposes. Additional drivers, embedded in the resources section of the binary are also decompressed using the Windows LZ32.dll, an extraction library, depending on the operating system version. The drivers used include:   

  • DRV_X64/DRV_XP_X64  
  • DRV_X86/DRV_XP_X86  
To install the appropriate driver, the malware will attempt to elevate privileges by leveraging the Windows function “AdjustTokenPrivileges” after the LUID for the SeBackupPrivilege privilege has been retrieved by the “LookupPrivilegeValueW” function

Once the driver is installed, the registry subkey HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl is modified, setting the value of the key “CrashDumpEnabled” to 0, disabling the creation of local crash dumps.   The driver is registered as EPMNTDRV, allowing the malware to interact with the local drives attached to the system. The malware attempts to overwrite the first 512 bytes, which is the location of the MBR of the bootable drive.

HermeticWiper also stops the VSS (Volume Shadow Copy) service, disabling VSS backup capabilities
Finally, the malware initiates a system shutdown.
Mitigating HermeticWiper 
The currently known HermeticWiper samples are detected and blocked by the Endpoint Standard product by default when using the Standard policy. The Enterprise EDR product will detect current samples by default. We recommend ensuring that you are using the most current VMware Carbon Black Cloud sensor version.  
It is critical that comprehensive and robust data backup protocols and solutions are in place which meet the 3-2-1 data backup rule to ensure data restoration is possible during a worst-case scenario, and to protect against the advanced capabilities of this adversary. We strongly urge customers to have redundant methods for data storage with at least one backup available offline, which will help with the recovery process in the event of successful encryption or destruction.  
  
 Indicators of Compromise 
  
Indicator   Type   Context  
0385eeab00e946a302b24a91dea4187c1210597b8e17cd9e2230450f5ece21da   SHA256   HermeticWiper  
1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc942b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591   SHA256      HermeticWiper  
2c10b2ec0b995b88c27d141d6f7b14d6b8177c52818687e4ff8e6ecf53adf5bf   SHA256      HermeticWiper  
3c557727953a8f6b4788984464fb77741b821991acbf5e746aebdd02615b1767   SHA256      HermeticWiper  
4dc13bb83a16d4ff9865a51b3e4d24112327c526c1392e14d56f20d6f4eaf382   SHA256   Ransomware  

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